

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6875

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

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SUBJ: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORT (U)

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1. (U) SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING IS THE AMERICAN EMBASSY DENMARK FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCE TELEGRAM. THE BULK OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN THE LATEST MSAP AND JSOP SUBMISSIONS. IN GENERAL, THE DANISH GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE PROGRAMS FOR PROCUREMENT OF US DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES DURING THE 1980'S. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROGRAM IS BASED ON DENMARK'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND STRATEGIC LOCATION. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE US OBJECTIVES IN DENMARK. THE PLANNED ACQUISITIONS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MORE THAN A LIMITED ECONOMIC IMPACT ON DENMARK, ARE WITHIN NATO PLANNING GUIDELINES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON

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ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. THE DANISH CONSTITUTION, LAW AND TRADITION EFFECTIVELY GUARANTEE HUMAN RIGHTS. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) THE RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO THE APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3.A. OF THE REFERENCE AND ARE NUMBER ACCORDINGLY:

A.(1)(S) DENMARK IS A MEMBER OF NATO AND IS A SIGNATORY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO A MUTAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT (1950) AND AN AGREEMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF GREENLAND (1951). THE SECURITY

ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH DENMARK IS IN US FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS RELATIONSHIP CONTRIBUTES TO OUR COMMON EFFORTS AS NATO ALLIES IN COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND IN PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NATO TREATY AREA. IN PARTICULAR, BY ADDING TO DENMARK'S PERCEIVED CAPABILITY TO DETER WARSAW PACT AGGRESSION, IT REINFORCES DENMARK'S RESISTANCE TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE ITS POLICY AND DISCOURAGES EXPANSION OF RESIDUAL NEUTRALIST SENTIMENT. SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE AND RESPONSIVE MOBILIZATION BASE.
- (B) ASSIST IN OBTAINING NECESSARY RIGHTS, AUTHORIZATIONS AND FACILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR US AND ALLIED FORCES AND DENY THEM TO FORCES OPPOSED TO US INTERESTS.
- (C) DEFEND NATIONAL TERRITORY, CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE/SEA AREAS AND MARITIME/AIR ROUTES WITH EMPHASIS ON CONTROLLING ACCESS ROUTES TO THE BALTIC SEA.
- (D) ENCOURAGE POSITIVE PARTICIPATION IN NATO'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
- (E) ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES INCLUDING COOPERATIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS CAPABLE OF MEETING NATO-ASSIGNED DEFENSE TASKS.
- (F) ENCOURAGE RATIONALIZATION/STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY OF FORCES WITH OTHER NATO NATIONS IN NORTHERN EUROPE.

(2)(S) THE THREAT. THE PRIMARY THREAT TO DANISH SECURITY STEMS FROM WARSAW PACT GOALS IN THE NORTHERN REGION. WARSAW PACT OBJECTIVES IN DENMARK ARE TIED ESSENTIALLY TO MARITIME CONTROL OF THE BALTIC AND NORTH SEAS. PACT NAVAL FORCES WOULD PROBABLY STRIVE
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TO DOMINATE THE BALTIC SEA FROM THE OUTSET OF EAST-WEST HOSTILITIES AND WOULD ALSO SEEK TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OF EXITS INTO THE NORTH SEA. THIS EFFORT WOULD BE FACILITATED BY SOVIET, POLISH, AND PERHAPS EAST GERMAN GROUND FORCES ADVANCING WITH AIR, AMPHIBIOUS, AND AIRBORNE SUPPORT INTO DENMARK FROM THE SOUTH. THE COASTS IN SOUTHERN DENMARK, WITH THEIR PARTLY OBSTRUCTED AND RESTRICTED APPROACHES AND RUGGED TERRAIN, ARE NOT PARTICULARLY SUITED FOR LARGE-SCALE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS; BUT MOST OF THE TERRAIN OF DENMARK LENDS ITSELF TO AIRBORNE OPERATIONS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE WARSAW PACT COULD, ALTHOUGH WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, OCCUPY DENMARK IF IT CHOSE TO DO SO. THE WARSAW PACT'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO DENY USE OF DENMARK'S STRATEGIC POSITION TO THE WESTERN ALLIES WITH THE EMPLOYMENT OF A MINIMUM NUMBER OF FORCES. PACT FORCES WOULD PROBABLY LIMIT OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA UNTIL AFTER DENMARK WAS SECURED AND ADEQUATE AIR COVER WAS PROVIDED. AFTER GAINING CONTROL OF JUTLAND, THE PACT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONDUCT UNRESTRICTED MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA AREA. WITHIN DENMARK, THE PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY HISTORICAL FACTORS AND CURRENT SOCI-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY. DENMARK'S EXPERIENCES IN WORLD WAR II AND THE USSR'S THREATENING ACTIONS IN THE EARLY POST-WAR PERIOD CAUSED DENMARK TO ABANDON ITS HUNDRED-YEAR LONG

POLICY OF NEUTRALITY, BUT DANISH APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING AGGRESSIVE WARSAW PACT INTENTIONS HAVE FADED WITH TIME; A CONSENSUS SEEMS TO HAVE DEVELOPED, ESPECIALLY IN NON-MILITARY CIRCLES, THAT A SOVIET MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WEST HAS BECOME IMPORBABLY WITHOUT A MAJOR SHIFT IN THE PRESENT EAS-WEST POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. THE DANES HAVE CONSEQUENTLY BEEN STRONG SUPPORTERS OF THE WESTERN POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE PREDOMINANCE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS IN DENMARK THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES HAS ALSO PLAYED A ROLE, PARTICULARLY IN RECENT TIMES, IN A GREATER EMPHASIS ON SUPPORT

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OF WELFARE PROGRAMS RATHER THAN THE MAINTENANCE OF A WELL-EQUIPPED MODERN DEFENSE FORCE. DANISH MILITARY PLANNERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE COUNTRY'S AND NATO'S IN PLACE DEFENSES ARE INADEQUATE TO RESIST A WARSAW PACT ATTACK FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD AND TEND TO RELY ON THE CONCEPT OF EXTENSIVE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE SHOULD HOSTILITIES DEVELOP. IN THE EVENT OF AN EAST-WEST CONFLICT, THE DANISH NAVY WOULD ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT ITS PRINCIPAL MISSION OF SECURING THE DANISH STRAITS. ITS ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THIS MISSION WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE AMOUNT OF WARNING TIME PROVIDED AND THE AVAILABILITY OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF AIR DEFENSE. THE MAJORITY OF DANISH COMBATANT SHIPS COULD BE COMBAT OPERATIONAL WITHIN TWO DAYS OF A MOBILIZATION ORDERM DANISH CONCERNS WOULD CENTER ON THE POSSIBLITY OF A PARTIAL OR TOTAL OCCUPATION OF DANISH TERRITORY. DANISH FORCES WHICH HAD MANAGED TO

LEAVE THE COUNTRY PRIOR TO OCCUPATION WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO STAGE A SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN AGAINST OCCUPYING FORCES, DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

(3)(U) THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE
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THREAT FROM WHAT IT UNDERSTANDS TO BE THE HOST COUNTRY'S ESTIMATES.

(4)(C) TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THE HOST COUNTRY BELIEVES
SUITED TO MEET THE COUNTRY'S REQUIREMENTS AND THE THREAT:

SERVICE//CURRENT STRENGTH//FORCE OBJECTIVE

ARMY//21,500//21,500

NAVY//5,800//6,000

AIR FORCE//7,000//7,000

(5)(S/NF) DANISH SUPPORT FOR NATO IS PRINCIPALLY INFLUENCED BY A DESIRE TO KEEP THE COUNTRY'S EXPENDITURE AT THE MINIMUM NECESSARY LEVEL AND TO PROMOTE DETENTE WITH EASTERN EUROPE. NO ALTERNATIVE TO PARTICIPATION IN NATO AND THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE IS CONSIDERED REALISTIC OR FEASIBLE TO PROTECT DENMARK AND EUROPE FROM THE USSR. DANISH SENSITIVITY TO THE GROWING STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE BALTIC AND THEIR STEADY MOVEMENT OF MANEUVERS AND OPERATIONS CLOSER TO DENMARK HAVE PROMPTED AN INCREASE IN DANISH SUPPORT FOR NATO. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SIZEABLE US FORCES IN EUROPE IS RECOGNIZED AS NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN DEFENSE POSTURE. ALTHOUGH A PARTICIPANT IN NATO'S NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP, DENMARK IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE ITS POLICY OF PROHIBITING PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN ITS BORDER OR THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE COUNTRY IN PEACETIME. DENMARK IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT UPON EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENT FOR ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE. DENMARK DOES NOT HAVE AN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

(6)(C) THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING 31 MARCH 1978 WAS SET AT \$995 MILLION, OR ABOUT 07.1PC OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET AND 2.5PC OF THE ESTIMATED GNP. IN VIEW OF THE VERY MODEST SHARE OF THE NATIONAL PRODUCT THAT DENMARK DEVOTES TO DEFENSE, AN EXPANDED MILITARY EFFORT WOULD NOT RAISE SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES ARE LIMITED, AND DENMARK WILL BE REQUIRED TO PRESERVE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND EXTERNALLY.

(7)(U) INFORMATION IS CONTAINED IN FY 80-84 MSAP SUBMITTED IN
NOVEMBER 1977.

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(8)(S) THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE DANISH NEEDS IN
TERMS OF ARTICLES AND SERVICES.

(-) ARMY. MAJOR PROCUREMENT PLANS FOR THE RDA INCLUDE ACQUISITION OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, TOW AND DRAGON, WHICH ARE REQUIRED TO AUGMENT THEIR LIMITED EXISTING CAPABILITY. THE ADDITION OF CHAPPARAL AND

ROLAND IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. A RECCE VEHICLE IS NEEDED TO REPLACE OBSOLETE M41A1 TANKS.

(B) NAVY. THE RDN HAS A CONTINUING PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZATION OF ITS FORCES. THE EXISTING FRIGATES WILL BE INSTALLED WITH HARPOON SSM MISSILES AND NATO SEA SPARROW SAM MISSILES. THREE NEW CORVETTES ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH HARPOON AND SEA SPARROW. TEN NEW CONSTRUCTION FPBS WILL BE CONFIGURED WITH HARPOON. A NEW COMMAND/CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (CCIS) IS REQUIRED FOR FLAG OFFICER DENMARK'S HEADQUARTERS. AN ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE (ASMD) SYSTEM WILL BE PROCURED.

(C) AIR FORCE. THE F-61 PROGRAM CONTINUES TO BE THE LARGEST PROCUREMENT PROGRAM IN THE DANISH ARMED FORCES. THE DANISH GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY SELECTED THE OPTION TO PURCHASE TEN MORE AIRCRAFT FOR A TOTAL OF 58. ADDITIONAL RDAF PLANS CALL FOR EVENTUAL REPLACEMENT OF THE NIKE HERCULES SAM BATTALIONS WITH AN IMPROVED SYSTEM SUCH AS PATRIOT. ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ARE REQUIRED FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE ARMY AND FOR FISHERIES INSPECTION. DANISH PARTICIPATION IN AWACS IS PROBABLE.

(9)(C) AN ASPECT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT THAT HAS SOME RELEVANCE TO DENMARK IS THE EFFECT THAT ACQUISITION MIGHT HAVE ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, GIVEN THE FACT THAT DENMARK HAS HAD A PERSISTENT DEFICIT IN ITS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. THE MAGNITUDES OF ACQUISITION ENVISIONED FOR THE PERIOD FY 1980-FY 1982, HOWEVER, DO NOT AT THIS TIME GIVE RISE TO CONCERN. DENMARK HAS HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING A SATISFACTORY RESERVE POSITION BY MEANS OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING ABROAD. DENMARK'S CREDIT RATING IS EXCELLENT AND IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN SO. THE GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN A SERIES OF AUSTERITY MEASURES TO IMPROVE ITS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION AND OTHERS ARE BEING CONTEMPLATED. THE OUTLOOK AT THIS TIME IS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY'S EXTERNAL BALANCE DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

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(10)(U) THE ANTICIPATED SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR DENMARK IN FY 1980-FY 1982 ARE WITHIN NATO PLANNING GUIDELINES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. THE TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED REPRESENT MODERNIZATION OF OBSOLETE MATERIEL.

(11)(U) DENMARK ATTACHES VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE OBSERVANCE AND MAINTENANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. GUARANTEES WITH RESPECT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON ARE SCRUPULOUSLY HEEDED. OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE METICULOUSLY OBSERVED. DENMARK IS ACTIVE IN EFFORTS TO SECURE GREATER INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HAS SUBSCRIBED TO ALL THE CONVENTIONS APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE UN TO SECURE THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. DENMARK IS ALSO ACTIVE IN THE EFFORTS OF THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS TO EXTEND INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW, AMONG THEM THE FOUR GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN TIMES OF WAR.

(12)(S) DURING THE PERIOD 1954-1977 DENMARK HAS RECEIVED \$283.5

MILLION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US, OF WHICH \$56.5 MILLION WAS IN GRANT OR DISCOUNT AID. IN 1977 DENMARK HAD \$43.5 MILLION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE DELIVERED. DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME 1954-1977 DENMARK DELIVERED \$58 MILLION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE, OF WHICH \$10.0 MILLION WAS IN GRANT OR DISCOUNT AID.

(13)(F)(C) IT OUR OUR OPINION THAT THE CURRENT LEVEL (LEVEL 3) IS THE MINIMUM LEVEL (LEVEL 1) NECESSARY FOR ODC DENMARK OPERATION. THE CURRENT MANNING IS THE RESULT OF PERSONNEL CUTS ABSORBED DURING FY 1977. ANY FURTHER MANNING REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO FULFILLING ITS OBJECTIVES. DURING THE FY 1979-FY 1982 PERIOD THE F-16 PROGRAM WILL SHIFT FROM PROGRAM DEFINITION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND DELIVERY PHASE. THIS WILL NECESSITATE MUCH ATTENTION TO DETAIL TO INSURE THAT THE TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, AND AIRCRAFT DELIVERY SCHEDULES ARE PROPERLY COORDINATED. IN ADDITION, THE PROBABILITY EXISTS THAT
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DENMARK WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE AWACS PROGRAM AND ALSO PROCURE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. THE MISSION MAY WISH TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE ADEQUACY OF PRESENT MINIMUM LEVEL ODC STAFFING, WHEN THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS BECOME KNOWN.
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